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winning Back the Intellectuals: Inside Canada’s
“first war on Terror,” 1968-1970
MIChAEL gAUvREAU
Abstract
Historical treatments of the October Crisis have tended to focus on a simple
dichotomy between the aims of the Canadian government and the Front de
Libération du Québec, have suggested the tensions in the relationship between
federal and provincial levels of government during the crisis, or have sought to
situate the FLQ within the emergence of a new strain of radical ideas in Québec
during the 1960s. This paper takes as its starting-point the irony of the reluc-
tance of the Trudeau government to brand the FLQ as “terrorists,” and
examines the federal government’s response within a larger strategy to force the
intellectual communities in both English Canada and Québec away from a sym-
pathy for student radicalism and international decolonization struggles. It
situates the Trudeau government’s “war on terror” as less an episodic response
to the kidnappings of James Cross and Pierre Laporte, but within a growing
strand of conservatism in the encounter of the authorities with elements of the
cultural revolution of the 1960s. It poses the question of whether the nature of
the federal government’s response may have been due to the desire, among mem-
bers of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s inner circle, to promote a new type of
liberal ideology that sought to dispense with older versions that legitimated civic
participation through non-elected, “representative” bodies by defining the lat-
ter as conscious or unwitting accomplices of terrorist violence. The paper is
based on a range of newly-declassified documents from both the federal cabinet
and the security services deposited in Pierre Trudeau’s prime ministerial
archive, as well as a new reading of newspaper and media sources in Québec. 
Résumé
Les analyses historiques de la Crise d’octobre ont tendance à se cristalliser
autour d’une dichotomie simple entre les intentions du gouvernement du
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Canada et le Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), à souligner les tensions
entre les États fédéral et provincial pendant la crise, ou encore à replacer  le
FLQ dans le contexte de l’éclosion d’idées radicales au Québec des années
1960.  La présente recherche prend comme point de départ la réticence para-
doxale de l’administration Trudeau à qualifier les felquistes de « terroristes »
et étudie la réaction du gouvernement fédéral dans le contexte d’une stratégie
élargie visant à forcer l’intelligentsia tant anglo-canadienne que québécoise à
se désolidariser du radicalisme étudiant et des luttes de décolonisation inter-
nationales.  L’auteur envisage la « guerre au terrorisme » entreprise par le
gouvernement Trudeau moins comme une réaction ponctuelle à l’enlèvement
de James Cross et de Pierre Laporte que comme un élan de conservatisme sus-
cité par la rencontre des autorités avec certains éléments de la révolution
culturelle des années 1960.  Il se demande si la réaction du gouvernement
fédéral est attribuable à la volonté, qui existait dans le cercle restreint du pre-
mier ministre Trudeau, de promouvoir un nouveau type de libéralisme.
Opposés aux tendances anciennes de légitimation de la participation civique
par le truchement d’organismes « représentatifs » non élus, Trudeau et les siens
auraient caractérisé ces derniers de complices, volontaires ou inadvertants,
d’actes de violence terroriste.  Cet article repose sur une série de documents
nouvellement déclassifiés du cabinet fédéral et des services secrets déposés
dans les archives du premier ministre Trudeau, ainsi que sur une relecture de
périodiques et de sources médiatiques du Québec.  
it would be very difficult to see how, if the Government had had the support,
as it did not only of the large mass of the population, but also of the interme-
diary groups, the unions, the media, the professional associations and the
universities, the crisis could have reached the proportions that it did.1
Since 2001, Canadians have participated in a global “War on terror,” a strug-gle engaging diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and military efforts.
However, none of these interventions has matched either the military man-
power or the political resources directed to the suppression, almost 40 years ago
now, of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), between October 1970 and
January 1971.2 this confrontation between the Canadian and Québec govern-
ments and the FLQ, a group of home-grown terrorists, has entered Canadian
history as the “October Crisis.” though the facts are well-known, historical
debate has centred around the rationale behind the imposition of the War
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1 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Fonds pierre elliott trudeau (hereafter pet),
MG 26 001, 41-3, FLQ Documentation, “Report of the Strategic Operations Centre,” 10-12-
1970.
2 ibid., 43-18, General “SitRep no. 17, Dept. of national Defence,” 30-10-1907. the operation
involved over 10,000 troops, 1,200 vehicles, and 53 aircraft.
Measures Act (WMA) by the federal government on 16 October 1970. Was the
WMA, with its abridgment of civil liberties in the name of rooting out FLQ ter-
rorism, a response out of proportion to the actual extent of the insurrectionary
threat? Was Québec, in fact, in a state of “apprehended insurrection” on 15
October 1970? 
though these events occurred nearly 40 years ago, there is a curious imbal-
ance in the historiography surrounding the “October Crisis.” Historians now
know a great deal about the FLQ itself in terms of its members, ideology, and
its context within a wider culture of radicalism in both Quebec and Canada3
there are, however, two curious lacunae identified recently by William tetley,
a minister in Robert Bourassa’s cabinet during the October events and author of
a recent memoir on the crisis. One, a “silence” on the part of FLQ sympathiz-
ers who participated in some of the group’s activities, but more significantly, a
resounding absence of accounts from those implicated on the government side.4
this paper seeks to redress the imbalance by examining a large, recently declas-
sified federal documentation on the FLQ crisis assembled in the prime
Minister’s Office (pMO) as part of a quickly-orchestrated campaign against the
FLQ between October and December 1970. 
However, a number of disclaimers are necessary at the outset. First, this
paper makes no attempt to enter the lists of the debate between government
supporters and “revisionists” on the need to impose the WMA. that said, this
new documentation enables us to pose more precise questions: were the
Canadian and Québec governments, as many at the time claimed, “innocent” of
the extent of the FLQ threat, and therefore failed to take the necessary precau-
tions that might have precluded the resort to more extreme measures that
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cois (Montréal: editions parti pris, 1968); pierre Vallières, The Assassination of Pierre Laporte:
Behind the October 70 Scenario (toronto: James Lorimer, 1977). For recent historical treatments
placing the FLQ in a larger radical culture of the 1960s, see Éric Bédard, Chronique d’une insur-
rection appréhendée: la crise d’Octobre et le milieu universitaire (Sillery: Septentrion, 1998);
Éric Bédard, “the intellectual Origins of the October Crisis,” in Creating Postwar Canada,
1945–1975, eds. Magda Fahrni and Robert Rutherdale (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia press, 2008), 45–60; Manon Leroux, Les silences d’Octobre: les discours des acteurs
de la crise de 1970 (Montréal: VLB éditeur, 2002); Sean Mills, “the empire Within: Montreal,
the Sixties, and the Forging of a Radical imagination,” (ph.D. diss., Queen’s University, 2007);
Jean-philippe Warren, Ils voulaient changer le monde: le militantisme marxiste-léniniste au
Québec (Montréal: VLB éditeur, 2007); Bryan D. palmer, Canada’s 1960s: The Ironies of
Identity in a Rebellious Era (toronto: University of toronto press, 2009), 311–65. 
4 William tetley, The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider’s View (Montréal and kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University press, 2007), xix–xx. the only other published account of the October
events by a government figure was undertaken by Gérard pelletier, secretary of state in the
Liberal government of pierre trudeau. this work was entitled La crise d’Octobre (Montreal:
Les Éditions du Jour, 1971), translated into english as The October Crisis (toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1971; translated by Joyce Marshall).
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involved restriction on civil liberties? What did the federal government really
know about the FLQ, and to what extent did this knowledge shape a federal
counter-terror strategy? Did government officials believe that there was a good
case for the existence of a wider conspiracy that constituted a state of “appre-
hended insurrection” in Québec, which was advanced as the major justification
for the WMA? Was there a concerted attempt at the ideological and political
levels orchestrated by the federal government to beat back further threats of ter-
rorism from the FLQ? 
the major hypothesis advanced in this paper is that the October Crisis
affords a lens for a more finely-nuanced exploration of the history of liberalism
in Canada and Québec as it confronted the cultural transformations of the
1960s. indeed, it is possible to suggest that the capture and neutralization of
FLQ perpetrators was always coupled, in the mind of the trudeau Cabinet and
its civil servants, with the imperative necessity to engage in “a form of psy-
chological warfare”5 to counter what was perceived as a grave defection among
the media and intellectuals in both english Canada and Québec from the cen-
tral tenets of liberal democracy. in particular, government officials perceived a
number of these groups and individuals as dangerously compromised by their
adherence to an analogy between Québec and the third World, with the corol-
lary that violence was a legitimate part of the political process, especially when
it came to righting social injustices. Central to the government position was a
particular view of the social and cultural climate of the 1960s, which under-
pinned a conviction among many senior government figures, that all public
authorities, and not simply those in Québec, were facing a serious, long-term
crisis of legitimacy, and that further incidents of extremist violence were to be
expected. Ranging from the prime minister of Canada, the premier of Québec,
their ministers and officials, this effort involved the redefinition of democratic
thought and action as grounded in an absolute rejection of violence, a definition
that placed rather insurmountable obstacles between any mutual interaction or
cross-fertilization between liberalism and certain types of radical thought and
action. the Liberal governments of pierre trudeau and Robert Bourassa, while
flaunting their reformist credentials, used their experience of the October Crisis
to offer their respective publics a new liberalism that actively sought, in the
name of democracy, to eviscerate from the liberal canon older notions of “cor-
poratism” or the legitimacy of intervention in the public sphere by intermediary
bodies such as unions, citizens’ committees, and student groups. these groups,
once regarded as healthy channels for the exercise of public opinion, were
recast in the aftermath of the October Crisis in negative terms, as either con-
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5 LAC-pet, 38-20, Diary, notes for Mr. Chouinard, 26-10-1970.
duits for terrorist ideologies or activities or unwitting dupes or “multipliers” for
extremist groups such as the FLQ. Henceforth, liberal democracy in Canada
was to be a function of a personal, unmediated relationship between the gov-
ernment and the individual citizen based on a common adherence to values of
orderly change and a shared willingness to defend liberalism against the threat
of extremist violence. 
One of the prevailing tropes that characterized the authorities’ position in
the crisis was that Canada and Canadians were somehow “innocent,” and that
the kidnappings had brutally awakened Canadians to the fact that their society
was not immune from political violence.6 However, the moral dichotomy
between an “innocent” public and government and the calculated ruthlessness
of the terrorists has tended, both during the October Crisis and subsequently, to
obscure the question of what the government actually knew about the FLQ and
how this knowledge was used to calibrate a counter-terrorist strategy. By the
spring of 1970, the Montréal, Québec, and Canadian governments all possessed
knowledge of the FLQ, which had, after all, been pursuing a campaign of vio-
lent crimes since 1963. Moreover, all three levels of government had, at least
six months before October 1970, a clear prior warning that the FLQ intended to
pursue a strategy of political kidnapping in order to radicalize the masses, espe-
cially following the arrest in February 1970 of two alleged members of the FLQ
who were attempting to kidnap the israeli consul in Montréal.7 John Starnes,
Director-General of the Security and intelligence Branch of the RCMp, wrote
in April 1970 that “we must seriously consider the possibility that attempts to
kidnap prominent persons may be made” and urged the preparation of contin-
gency plans.8 Significantly, the same day, Starnes informed Solicitor-General
George Mcilraith of the possibility of radical elements in Québec resorting to
kidnapping to secure the release of “political prisoners,”9 while his colleague
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6 ibid., 38-3, Bill C-181, Speech of the Hon. John turner, 4 november 1970, Commons
Debates, public Order (temporary Measures) Act 1970, provision of emergency powers for
preservation of public Order, 883; ibid., 44-6, Speeches 1970, Government of Quebec,
Department of Justice, Office of the Minister; ibid., 38-4, Discours de M. Bourassa à
l’Assemblée nationale sur les événements survenus récemment au Québec d’après le Journal
des Débats du jeudi, 12 novembre 1970.
7 ibid., 46-15, Miscellaneous 1970-71, J.e.M. Barrette, Assistant Commissioner D.S.i. (RCMp),
“threats Against prominent individuals by Organizations or persons of “i” Directorate interest
— Canada,” 14 April 1970. For an earlier statement of this argument, see Reg Whitaker,
“Apprehended insurrection?: RCMp intelligence and the October Crisis,” Queen’s Quarterly
100, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 383–405, who states that the RCMp Security Service had infil-
trated the FLQ by the mid-1960s, had supplied the federal government with realistic
assessments of the threat of revolutionary terrorism, and had prepared contingency plans to
deal with possible kidnappings. 
8 LAC, pet, 46-15, Miscellaneous 1970-71, John Starnes, Director-General Security and
intelligence, “Memorandum,” 27 April 1970 
9 ibid., Starnes to Hon. George Mcilraith, Solicitor-General, 27 April 1970. 
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RCMp Assistant-Commissioner J.e.M. Barrette noted that “unsubstantiated
information” suggested that the FLQ intended to kidnap the premier of Québec
and murder hostages if their demands were not met, storing the bodies in aban-
doned, stolen cars.10 this was almost exactly the script adhered to by the FLQ
six months later. As early as 1 June 1970, one assessment of the Québec situa-
tion urged the federal government to “consider … attacking these organizations
with at least psychological warfare.”11 At this point, the RCMp initiated con-
tacts with the CiA to obtain information on the political ideologies motivating
similar incidents in Latin America.12
One of the central elements in the decision by both the Québec and
Canadian governments to invoke the WMA was the supposed evidence of a
concerted FLQ strategy to use escalating violence to publicize its aims, win
sympathy and support, and ultimately destabilize and paralyze the Québec gov-
ernment as the prelude to a popular insurrection. the question thus turns on
what the governments thought they knew about the FLQ as an organization. A
key component to support the thesis of prior planning was the supposed anal-
ogy between the FLQ and a variety of urban guerrilla organizations in Latin
America. the approach to the CiA yielded an appraisal of one of the central
texts of the Latin American revolutionary movement, the Brazilian Carlos
Marighella’s Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla.13 Based on this appraisal,
officials in the RCMp Security Services concluded as early as 14 April 1970,
that the FLQ was “motivated exclusively by recent events in Central and South
America which … might inspire similar acts in this country.”14
in his speech to the Québec national Assembly on 12 november 1970,
premier Bourassa referred to the existence of the FLQ’s four-stage plan, made
public by Lucien Saulnier, the chairman of the executive Committee of the city
of Montréal, which advocated an escalation from “violent demonstrations,
bombings, kidnappings, and selective assassinations.” Bourassa informed the
assembled legislators that three stages had already been successfully carried
out, and unless firm action was taken to break the terrorists, he feared that there
would be more kidnappings and actual assassinations.15 Saulnier’s allegations,
166
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10 ibid., Barrette, “threats Against prominent individuals.” 
11 ibid., 43-29, “polaris — On Matters Concerning Canada’s internal Security,” issue 5, 1 June
1970. 
12 ibid., Barrette, “threats Against prominent individuals.” 
13 ibid., 46-15, Miscellaneous 1970-71, J.e.M. Barrette to CO’s and Officers, 8 May 1970, “Carlos
Marighella’s Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla.” the Minimanual’s chief contribution to revo-
lutionary strategy was its emphasis on action by small cells of revolutionaries, designed to
obviate infiltration by the police. By kidnapping “important persons,” Marighella observed, a
small number of revolutionaries would be able to sustain pressure on the police and armed forces,
and by propagandizing government failures, would win the support of the masses of people. 
14 ibid., Barrette, “threats Against prominent individuals.” 
15 ibid., 38-4, “Discours de M. Bourassa à l’Assemblée nationale.” 
though sensational, were not new information, but had, in fact, been rehearsed
during 1969 testimony before a House of Commons committee investigating
allegations of links between the federally-funded Company of young
Canadians and revolutionary movements in Montréal. Calling for a federal
royal commission and immediate action to protect the security of the state,
Saulnier drew upon a document captured during a police raid, allegedly
authored by pierre Vallières. Although Saulnier’s allegations were greeted
skeptically in november 1969 by federal parliamentarians and generally dis-
counted as completely circumstantial in their linkage of the Company of young
Canadians and violent revolution,16 they, and Vallières’ Stratégie révolution-
naire were eagerly pursued by federal officials after 16 October 1970, as
evidence of a blueprint for FLQ plans for future terrorist acts. 
Once the October Crisis broke, this earlier documentation, some of which
dated from 1964, was dusted off and enlisted to understand the FLQ mind-set.
Documents purporting to link the Communist party of Canada with the FLQ,
circumstantial dealings between FLQ members and Cuban, Soviet, and French
officials made their rounds of various federal departments,17 but the two key
influences on government responses were the Minimanual and the comparison
between the FLQ and Latin American groups such as the tupamaros,18 and
Stratégie révolutionnaire. no less an authority than Lieutenant-General
Michael Dare, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, considered the latter pamphlet
“as one of great significance in that it sets forth the broad doctrinal outline for
the ‘liberation’ of Quebec from the bonds of Canadian colonialism, capitalism,
and American imperialism.” What was most disturbing for Canadian police
and intelligence officials was that the FLQ anticipated a long-term struggle
encompassing three stages of revolution: radicalization of social agitation;
organization of people into committees of liberation with a view to mass upris-
ing; and, finally, armed confrontation with the established order.19 Most
troubling for the government’s strategy was the estimate of intelligence offi-
cials that if the emergency powers of the WMA were of limited duration
(maximum of six months), this was of comparatively little significance for 
the FLQ, which was organized along the lines of a “compartment” type 
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16 On Saulnier’s evidence and his reception at the House of Commons hearings, see Marcel
pépin, “Montréal depose une preuve de 47 points — pour prouver la subversion de la CJC,”
La presse (28 novembre 1969); Gordon pape, “Saulnier at CyC Hearing City Labelled Rebel
HQ Canada-Wide Scrutiny Urged,” Montreal Gazette (28 november 1969). 
17 LAC, pet, 40-18, FLQ Documentation A-7, “Communist involvement in the Quebec
Separatist Movement,” 22 October 1970; ibid., 40-20, FLQ Documentation A-9, “FLQ
external influences,” 22 October 1970. 
18 ibid., 47-22, “terrorist Organization, 1970,” “Memorandum external Affairs to SOC — the
terrorist Movements in Canada and Uruguay — Similarities in tactics,” 6 november 1970. 
19 ibid., 40-13, FLQ Documents A-2, “Analyse de ‘Stratégie révolutionnaire: rôle de l’avant-
garde,” M.R. Dare, Lt.-General, Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, 25 October 1970. 
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of security difficult for the police or intelligence services to penetrate. the 
revolutionaries would simply submerge themselves and preserve their appara-
tus intact, and then reconstitute their network with “considerable
impunity.”20 even reckoning on the capture of Cross’s kidnappers and Laporte’s
killers, and the considerable public revulsion these acts engendered, government
officials rated the odds of the FLQ’s survival as “better than … even.”21 All this
seemed to point to the existence of some explicit, well-planned FLQ strategy
masterminded by an individual or group.22 even the shifting constellation of
radical groups in Montréal was interpreted in a nefarious light by the authorities
as “a deliberate attempt to confuse … and conceal the true identity of a clan-
destine group.”23 the Cross-Laporte kidnappings, far from being a final
confrontation, were “an exercise in technique,” with the FLQ probably reverting
to bombing and threats. its intention, pessimistically concluded one assessment,
was “to maintain an atmosphere of terrorism,” which would force governments
into making errors of judgment, which would ultimately “alienate the young.
they ‘do not propose to win, but merely to make the governments lose’.”24
From the perspective of the authorities, the prevailing tendency in these
assessments was to credit the organization with far more unity of purpose than
it in fact possessed.25 Whether or not the kidnappings were consciously orches-
trated by a centralized group of terrorist “masterminds,” intelligence
assessments of the situation subscribed to a conspiracy theory that posited a
dynamic and reciprocal connection between terrorist acts as events, and the
uncanny ability of FLQ leaders and propagandists to motivate and energize
potential masses of sympathizers.26 it is this that explains the rather bizarre
interview on 5 December 1970, between the recently-released James Cross, the
abducted British trade commissioner, and James Davey, program secretary to
prime Minister trudeau, and the federal official responsible for coordinating
the political campaign against the FLQ. Clearly influenced by government
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20 ibid., Barrette, “threats Against prominent individuals.” 
21 ibid., 40-12, “A paper on the FLQ,” 22 Oct. 1970.
22 ibid., 40-19, FLQ Documentation A-8, “FLQ – Organization and Membership,” 22 Oct. 1970.
23 ibid., 40-12, “A paper on the FLQ,” 22 Oct. 1970.
24 ibid., 41-9, FLQ Documentation A-30, “Observations Relating to the Critical political
Atmosphere in Canada,” 17 Oct. 1970.
25 this was the conclusion of one report written the day after the proclamation of the WMA.
ibid., “Observations Relating to the Critical political Atmosphere in Canada”.
26 More recent scholarship has downplayed the idea that there was an FLQ “ideology,” suggest-
ing that particularly after 1968, those engaged in the movement tended to be largely
anti-intellectual, and more dedicated to the idea that revolution would be achieved by “spon-
taneous” action that would supply a kind of shock therapy to galvanize the masses towards
revolutionary action. See Bédard, “the intellectual Origins of the October Crisis,” 53-60.
27 in this respect, the term “eye-witness” is somewhat problematic, because Cross stated that he had
been blindfolded throughout his captivity, although he appears to have had considerable verbal
discussion with his captors. He did not learn their names or identities until after his release. 
intelligence assessments and working from the premise that the FLQ possessed
a coherent ideology and long-term plan of action, Davey queried Cross, the
principal “eye-witness,” to the inner workings of an FLQ cell,27 on what moti-
vated his captors, their ideological beliefs, and whether they were taking orders
from above. For Cross, the outstanding feature of his captors was that while
they had a clear perspective on Québec as a colonized society, “their intellec-
tual basis in Marxism is very weak.” though aware of the Brazilian kidnapping
situation, none of them appeared to have read Marighella’s Minimanual or any
of the other classic statements of third-World revolutionary warfare.28 nor was
Cross giving Davey the answers he wanted about long-term revolutionary orga-
nization and strategy: beyond hinting at the existence of certain broad
guidelines for action and the possibility that there were other members, it
appeared no one in the Libération cell had any plans to enlist university or
CeGep students. More significantly, they evinced little interest in the writings
of pierre Vallières, regarded as one of the ideologists or “masterminds” of the
FLQ. nor beyond the building of parcel bombs disguised as children’s toys,
was there any planned long-term escalation of terror.29
if with hindsight we know that the authorities may well have overestimated
the numbers, coherence, and strategic abilities of the terrorists, assessments
based on the Minimanual and Stratégie révolutionnaire played a key role in
crafting an explicit counter-terrorism strategy by the federal government.
Writing on 8 October 1970, Under-Secretary of State for external Affairs A.e.
Ritchie was the first to suggest the need for a centralized, controlled federal
response managed by a small working group within the privy Council Office,
explicitly set up to consider what statements the prime minister should make in
response to a variety of possible outcomes to the Cross kidnapping.30 Within
the Cabinet, the decision to take a hard line to suppress the FLQ threat was
pushed most emphatically by the Minister of Regional and economic
expansion Jean Marchand, trudeau’s most senior Québec minister, and rein-
forced by principal Secretary Marc Lalonde, head of the pMO, who were both
worried about the likelihood of premier Bourassa losing control of the situa-
tion.31 However, it was only after the proclamation of the WMA on 16 October
1970, that the trudeau government established the Special Operations Centre
(SOC), a more formal mechanism to direct and coordinate federal strategy. to
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29 ibid.
30 LAC-pet, 40-9, A.e. Ritchie “Memorandum for Mr. R.G. Robertson (privy Council Office),
Oct. 8, 1970.”
31 For a recent account of decision-making during the Crisis, see John english, Just Watch Me:
The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, 1968-2000 (toronto: knopf Canada, 2009), 86-7. the sig-
nificance of Marchand’s influence on the decision has been suggested by Whitaker,
“Apprehended insurrection.”
WinninG BACk tHe inteLLeCtUALS: 
inSiDe CAnADA’S “FiRSt WAR On teRROR,” 1968-1970
this end, key figures within the pMO such as Lalonde and James Davey sought
to forge some direction and coordination among the four federal intelligence
agencies dealing with the crisis. Anticipating a drawn-out campaign against the
FLQ and lack of a positive outcome to Cross’s abduction, the cabinet agreed on
19 October 1970, to the constitution of a SOC within the pMO, headed by
James M. Davey, trudeau’s program secretary, who reported directly to Marc
Lalonde.32 the mandate of this organization was to end the overall lack of
political direction by channeling information from departments and agencies
directly to the pMO and cabinet, and to formulate and implement a communi-
cations strategy to contain and pre-empt FLQ strategy by harnessing “all the
levers the government have” to ensure the return of stability, which would
“allow all governments to return to the vital task of the reform and development
of Canadian society and its structures.”33 Armed with intelligence assessments
going back several months and a wealth of information now available about the
FLQ, a cabinet meeting on 18 October concluded that “there appeared to be an
FLQ strategy which must be contained and pre-empted by a federal strategy
which would retain and reinforce the confidence in an support of all Canadians
for their government.”34 At this point, despite the emergency powers of the
WMA having given the police and military the legal upper hand in their cam-
paign against the FLQ, the mood in trudeau’s inner circle was quite pessimistic
as to how the crisis was going to play out. Short-term analyses stressed the pos-
sibility of more demonstrations, with the “frightening” possibility of “explosive
escalation.” One report rated the possibility of large demonstrations, “’brutal’”
suppression of demonstrations, assassinations, further kidnappings, and the
death of Cross as “high,” and the capture of the FLQ terrorists as “low.”35
Gordon Gibson, one of the pM’s main policy advisers, specifically cited the
dangers “of a confrontation between the Army and student groups … in the
event that the Army remains in place for very long.”36 Gibson urged the federal
government to formulate contingency plans for the most likely scenario of “a
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long siege,” with emotions of shock and revulsion drained away, and “the gov-
ernment, the police, the Army, the War Measures Act looking increasingly
helpless and perhaps even ridiculous.”37
What emerged in Ottawa during the days and weeks following the procla-
mation of the WMA was the conviction that both Québec and Canada faced a
widespread threat at the level of basic values that went far beyond the rooting
out of a few terrorists. Clearly alarmed that a very small group of revolutionary
activists had triggered a process “in which many separate actions by individu-
als in various parts of Quebec society interacted to have a snowball effect,”
trudeau’s key advisers explained that ministers must realize that “there is a
substantial group of people in Canada, who not only do not accept the electoral-
parliamentary route as a means of bringing about change, but who actively
propose the use of violence to support their opinions.” Many of these radicals
were highly-educated and understood “the way in which the system functions,
its many inherent contradictions and of how to exploit these contradictions
either to slow down the system or to make it look ridiculous, the use of com-
munications in all forms, written, electronic, mass psychology, in all its
aspects.” While easy to dismiss as “bandits and criminals,” trudeau’s advisers
concluded that this element possessed “a coherent and well articulated philos-
ophy to justify to themselves and to their peers, both politically and morally, the
methods that they use, including violence.38 Ministers and senior officials were
concerned about what they considered an alarming political vacuum. in their
estimation, a profile of the authorities had emerged among the media and the
wider public, one that tended to highlight security rather than the political
struggle against separatism.39 this indicated an imperative need, not only for a
more well-calibrated coordination of a strategy that must ultimately be politi-
cal in character, but for a long-term campaign designed to break the
psychological hold that revolutionary activism had apparently established over
wide sections of the Québec population. 
One immediate problem lay in explaining how, despite having had clear
prior warning of political kidnappings from its own security services, Ottawa
did not take preventive action designed to forestall the FLQ.40 According to the
SOC, prior to Cross’s abduction, there was sufficient but not complete infor-
mation available to forewarn the government of the “possibility/probability of
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an ‘October crisis’ occurring” and to warrant preventative or preparatory steps.
the failure to do this was blamed on lack of mechanisms within the federal
government for “political evaluation” of information collected by the RCMp,
and an absence of effective channels of communication or of analytical tools to
relate information about the FLQ to wider political, social, and economic
developments.41
Central to the long-term strategy devised in the SOC was an emphasis on
a centrally-controlled “contre-offensive psychologique,” aimed at “isolating the
FLQ from the society in which it operates.”42 Despite statements for public
consumption that distinguished the FLQ from the parti Québécois (pQ), inner
circles of the federal government clearly maintained that a connection did exist
between the terrorists and the political separatist movement that maintained its
allegiance to electoral-parliamentary democracy. What so perplexed the author-
ities, and was underscored by the federal Justice Minister John turner as a
major rationale behind the imposition of the WMA, was that the ordinary
process of law was not designed to cope with a “criminal” organization like the
FLQ which paid “lip service to causes that are perfectly legitimate; causes such
as unemployment, inadequate housing, grievances of taxi drivers, and so on.”43
More troubling, the FLQ’s revolutionary activism clearly benefited from the
guerre psychologique waged by the pQ, which had successfully propagated a
fixed image of federalism and the government as manipulated by the rich.44
Given these perceptions, it was imperative, stated Deputy-Secretary to the
Cabinet M.A. Crowe, that the government break out of a “reactive mode” and
recover freedom of action — to clearly set forth that its priorities were reformist
rather than simply directed to the reimposition of law and order. Only the
understanding and use of psychological warfare would enable the government
to re-enlist the allegiance of “the legitimate forces for change within Canada.”45
this, according to A.e. Ritchie of external affairs, was absolutely crucial to
ensure that the government avoided doing anything that might “drive moderate
or radical opinion in[to] the arms of the FLQ.”46 While not holding this forth
as a panacea to solve the crisis in Canada or Québec, the key was to break the
image, held by a number of elements in Québec society, that the FLQ was a
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socially progressive force. in addition to assaulting the moral and ideological
credibility of revolutionary separatism, federal authorities maintained that the
decisive battleground would be the mass media, which was widely condemned
within government circles for disseminating false and misleading information
(i.e., FLQ propaganda) and for either consciously or unconsciously creating a
climate of sympathy for the FLQ, giving “aid and comfort to the radical
enemy.” it was here that the authorities estimated that they would be able to
break the back of the FLQ by detaching from the activist hard-core those indi-
viduals who sympathized with the terrorists out of ideological motivation to
better society.47 Looking beyond the immediate kidnappings, officials in the
pMO recommended setting up permanent organizational structures, in particu-
lar, a working group to be headed by Marc Lalonde, to deal with “revolution
and separatism.” this group would launch an expanded the coordinated intelli-
gence and information campaign designed to infiltrate the pQ and other
“intermediate” bodies48 in Québec, such as unions and anti-poverty groups
which had evinced too much sympathy for the FLQ. “Dans une année,”
lugubriously concluded one report, “il sera trop tard, car alors le FLQ aura
pénétré directement la masse révolutionnaire.”49
the conflation of terrorism and separatism, and the recasting of the crisis as
a question of psychology rather than as an issue of national security, reflected two
significant concerns which influenced the thinking of the prime minister’s inner
circle. First, despite the overwhelming public support both in english Canada and
Québec for the proclamation of the WMA and the refusal to accede to FLQ
demands,50 there was a persistent fear that the authorities might, in the long run,
lose the battle for the hearts and minds of Canadians because they did not com-
mand the full allegiance of the “intellectuals,” a term variously used to describe
the media, university professors, and students. the corollary to this belief was that
winning the adhesion of this group to the virtues of electoral-parliamentary
democracy was key to the long-term stability and progress of Canadian society,
which government officials regarded as troubled by what they viewed as a grow-
ing wave of radical dissent. this flowed from a specific interpretation of the social
and cultural changes of the 1960s, which stressed the “frustration” and “confu-
sion” of young university students as the key vector of protest and revolutionary
activism. Second, the location of the October Crisis in the psychological-intellec-
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tual realm was a strategy engaged in by federal officials to deflect attention from
what many of them considered a rather weak case for “apprehended insurrection,”
the key justification for the assumption of emergency powers. 
in the days that followed the proclamation of the WMA, pierre trudeau’s
inner circle sought some coordinated direction over the campaign against the
FLQ. One of the more interesting discussions centred around the language to
be employed to describe the adversary. Up to that point, media commentators,
Canadian and Québec government ministers had used the term “terrorist” to
describe the FLQ; but a number of the prime minister’s advisers were clearly
uncomfortable with this designation, as one that was too positive and tending
to legitimize the organization and purposes of the FLQ. Writing to Marc
Lalonde, Gordon Gibson summarized the reservations felt by a number of offi-
cials regarding the terminology employed to describe the “bandits.” “the use
of the word ‘terrorists,’” Gibson stated, “connotes a depth and continuity to the
movement which we would wish to avoid, and that the description of the group
as the ‘FLQ’ inevitably cloaks them with some of the legitimacy of a political
party.”51 the relative caution surrounding the use of a term that is today
employed far more indiscriminately is revelatory both of the government’s
sense of a rather tenuous relationship with the intellectual community, and the
rather positive view that “liberation front” struggles enjoyed in a vocal and
influential, though perhaps small, segment of Canadian opinion, but one that
both the Canadian and Québec governments regarded as critical to rebuilding
social consensus and stable authority. 
Writing in January 1971, after the immediate urgency of the crisis had
passed and the army had withdrawn from Québec, James Davey vented his dis-
pleasure to Ramsay Cook who, with a number of prominent academics and
personalities in Quebec and english Canada, had endorsed a booklet critical of
the WMA. Although one of the key “organic intellectuals” of Canadian liberal-
ism and a major backer of pierre trudeau,52 Cook became the target of official
wrath because he did not concur with the necessity of the WMA, a position
which, Davey reckoned, would hamper government efforts at political stabi-
lization. prominent personalities such as Cook clearly did not appreciate the
precariousness of the situation, which Davey ascribed to the fissure between the
authorities and the intellectuals. How, he wondered, had the FLQ been able to
command more space “in the electronic and written media of this country than
the elected representatives?” Building to a paroxysm of anger, Davey reminded
Cook of the moral failings of his fellow intellectuals and social progressives:
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“this was a province, in which ‘the editor of a respected newspaper’ idly spec-
ulated on the life of the government. this was a province in which some of the
‘elite’ recommended that the government give in to the demands of the FLQ.
this was a province in which, to my knowledge, virtually no intellectual stood
up at the height of the crisis to give any kind of moral support to the govern-
ment.”53
the vehemence of this exchange reflected a nagging sense in trudeau’s
inner circle that the rationale for acceding to the Québec government’s request
to use the WMA was highly debatable and that despite the massive public
approbation, the federal government had not made the strongest possible case
for using emergency powers. What the pMO feared, more than anything else,
was that the October Crisis would drag on with no resolution to Cross’s abduc-
tion, and despite the replacement of the WMA in november 1970 by a more
anodyne public Order (temporary Measures) Act, the authorities would have to
contemplate making a case for extending the emergency legislation beyond
April 1971, which would expose the government to more critical scrutiny of
their intentions and actions. From the perspective of the pMO and Cabinet, the
existence of an “influential group in Quebec,” centred on Claude Ryan, the edi-
tor of Le Devoir, and René Lévesque, leader of the pQ, who were critical of the
actions of both Québec and Canadian governments during the hostage crisis,
and opposed to the WMA, was highly problematic, as there was in existence a
respectable counter-narrative of the October Crisis at odds with government
claims, one that could not simply be dismissed as inspired by the FLQ. As one
official in the pMO declared, the “propaganda line” proffered by Ryan,
Lévesque, and their supporters “reinforced by the widespread concern about
civil rights, could be fairly effective in blurring these issues,” because they
enjoyed “a good deal of credibility in the minds of many educated
Quebeckers.”54 Government spokesmen were acutely conscious of the fact that
the case for the WMA rested upon the concept of “apprehended insurrection,”
rather than upon the fact of an actual insurrection. it was a justification that
always, in their minds, was exposed to contestation, and was one that a number
of key advisers to the prime minister found a weak grounds for the imposition
of emergency measures. 
Despite outward solidarity between the Liberal administrations at Ottawa
and Québec City, there was, in fact, a significant difference in interpretation of
the nature of “apprehended insurrection” offered by spokesmen for the respec-
tive governments. For premier Robert Bourassa and his Justice Minister Jérôme
Choquette, the situation on 15 October 1970, was critical, because the police
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forces were exhausted in dealing with the hostage crisis, and the negotiations
between the government and the FLQ had reached an impasse. the interven-
tion of the FLQ Chénier cell, which kidnapped pierre Laporte, produced,
according to Choquette, “an extremely ambiguous situation,” raising the possi-
bility of further social deterioration accentuating the fragile position of the
Québec government.55 Québec cabinet ministers, in particular, have cited the
14 October 1970 petition of the 16 “eminent” personalities, urging the govern-
ment to show greater flexibility in negotiating to save Cross and Laporte and
the “Grand Soir” demonstration of 15 October at the paul Sauvé Arena in
Montréal, where a crowd of 3,000 listened to pierre Vallières, Charles Gagnon,
and Michel Chartrand, president of the Montréal Central Council of the
Confederation des Syndicats nationaux (CSn) whip up support for the FLQ
Manifesto.56
However, the “fragility of authority” thesis advanced by Bourassa and his
ministers was contested by no less a figure than pierre trudeau himself. in a 5
november 1970 interview on the CBC program “encounter,” the prime minis-
ter responded to a question from regarding the state of the Québec government
by declaring, “i wasn’t worried at anytime that the Government would be upset
by a coup d’état or anything like that.” Rather, trudeau alluded to the insuffi-
ciency of the means at the disposal of the police, the province, and the city of
Montréal to “come to grips with the terrorist conspiracy.”57 Likewise, trudeau
moved quickly to scotch rumours swirling regarding Claude Ryan’s role in
attempting to establish a “provisional government” that would have, at the
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height of the hostage crisis, replaced Bourassa’s Liberal team, reminding his
interviewers that Ryan had simply written an editorial outlining three hypo-
thetical scenarios that might result from the hostage crisis.58 indeed, the public
pronouncements of the federal government were explicitly crafted to draw
attention away from any precise chain of evidence or of the existence of any
precise FLQ plan that would underpin the claim that Québec was in a state of
“apprehended insurrection.” this was obliquely suggested by the prime minis-
ter himself in his national broadcast of 16 October, in which he urged
Canadians “not to become so obsessed by what the government has done today
in response to terrorism that they forget the opening play in this vicious game.
that play was taken by the revolutionaries; they chose to use bombing, murder,
and kidnapping.”59 For Justice Minister John turner, the government did not
have to prove the existence of wider conspiracies or “allegations of provisional
governments.” turner had harsh words for those “who still continue to suggest
that our decision had to be based upon some sort of tallying up, some sort of
mathematical summary of the number of sticks of dynamite that had been
stolen, or the estimate of the number of terrorists involved with the FLQ and
the number of specific instances of violence that had taken place.” He coun-
tered that the government’s decision “involved a value judgment” that had to be
seen against a “total background” of events in Québec that formed “a contin-
uum of change in the social fabric of that province.”60
Within trudeau’s inner circle, there was considerable discussion surround-
ing the crafting of a justification and some questioning of the amount of
information that should be released to the Canadian public. While it is certainly
true that the immediate public support for the proclamation of the WMA was
overwhelmingly positive, there were certain notes of skepticism. For example,
on 27 October, reports received from 17 of 22 Liberal riding presidents in the
Montréal area noted that on the subject of a widespread and growing FLQ con-
spiracy, “généralement on n’y croit pas: ce n’est pas possible qu’au Québec,
quelques hommes renversent le gouvernement.” their suggestion regarding the
WMA: “laisser mourir cette affaire si possible.”61 Because of this widespread
skepticism, the federal cabinet set forth a series of guidelines for public state-
ments by ministers. it was especially important “not to give any indications that
more information will be forthcoming in the future to justify the actions of the
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government. the important facts are known and a judgment was made. no
amount of future information will make happy the people who are criticizing
now.”62 in the opinion of Deputy-Secretary to the Cabinet M.A. Crowe, it was
not necessary to identify particular FLQ plots; but it was incumbent upon the
authorities to establish that there were serious underlying conditions of insta-
bility, unrest, and dissatisfaction that might have discredited the regime
sufficiently that it would have been forced to abdicate; and, secondly, “that
there is in existence a disciplined and determined revolutionary group whose
significant membership may be extremely small but which is prepared to take
advantage of the situation.”63
Unfortunately, for Crowe’s chain of reasoning, the prime minister himself,
a few weeks later poured cold water on the notion that the crisis was of suffi-
cient magnitude to have compelled the abdication of the Québec government —
a notion also repudiated by William tetley’s “insider” account of the October
Crisis64 — and in the ensuing weeks, government intelligence assessments also
tended to discount the notion of a well-organized revolutionary conspiracy that
had infiltrated the student milieus of Québec.65 By early December, the RCMp
Security Services informed the pMO that it was no longer reasonable to “talk of
a plan in which the FLQ masterminded the actions of hundreds of people ….
Rather it is more realistic to think that they created a basic situation that was
exploited by the parti Québécois and many other individuals for their own par-
ticular purposes.”66 Here, the focus had clearly shifted from revolutionary
terrorism to the “threat” to Canadian federalism posed by a legitimate sover-
eignty option, and a denunciation of the failure of “intellectuals” to support the
government’s position. indeed, while insiders like James Davey continued to
insist that the government had correctly assessed the nature of an “apprehended
insurrection,” and had engaged in a proper exercise of judgment in order to pro-
tect Canadians and ward off future violence,67 other high-placed officials were
not so sure. Gordon Robertson, the Clerk of the privy Council, advised the prime
minister to turn down the request of Robert Stanfield, the leader of the opposi-
tion, for a royal commission into “the background of the terrorism and other
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events leading up to the War Measures Act as well as the administration of the
Act.”68 in his official response to Stanfield, trudeau cited the fact that terrorism
was still going on and it would be unwise to reveal sources of intelligence nec-
essary for police work; however, Robertson’s advice went beyond this, urging
trudeau that a royal commission “could not do other than reopen for contention
a whole host of arguments that would be damaging both in Quebec and in the
country generally.”69 in proffering this advice, Robertson was clearly worried
that the government’s case for apprehended insurrection might not, in light of
recent developments, actually hold up in the court of public opinion, and this
might give credence to the much-derided “intellectuals” like Ryan and Lévesque
by validating their stand in defence of civil liberties. 
perhaps the most skeptical and critical conclusion to be drawn by someone
from the inner circle was that of D.F. Wall, assistant-secretary to the cabinet for
security matters. Anticipating that emergency legislation might have to be
extended beyond April 1971, Wall was concerned that the government would
have to make a reasonable case to the Canadian public, and would have to
answer questions regarding the significant role that certain incidents, such as
the Grand Soir at the paul Sauvé Arena, played in the decision of the Québec
and Canadian governments to resort to emergency powers. Rather than the fiery
invocation to violence that Bourassa, Choquette, and tetley remembered from
this occasion, Wall’s own sources described the assembly as “dull and
unprovocative” which began as a “cheerful political meeting” to support the
Front d’action populaire (FRAp), the Montréal municipal party opposed to
Mayor Jean Drapeau. While copies of the FLQ Manifesto had been passed out
at the door, no one present regarded the assembly as supportive of the FLQ, and
the audience evinced disinterest and cynicism towards the FLQ cause, and there
was certainly no descent into the streets in support of revolutionary violence. if
this was true, Wall stated, “it is probable that any attempt by the Government
to justify the invocation of the War Measures Act on the basis of incidents such
as this will be laughed out of court.” He suggested that the government be pre-
pared to make “a realistic case” for continuing emergency legislation. in the
final analysis, the government could not rely upon “shock and fear” to maintain
a public consensus in favour of its stand in Québec, but would ultimately have
to offer factual evidence to explain its position.70 Fortunately for the authori-
ties, the release of James Cross on 3 December 1970, obviated the need to seek
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an extension of the emergency legislation beyond April 1971, and the govern-
ment did not have to offer more information to the Canadian public. 
However, perhaps the most intriguing element that emerges from the gov-
ernment response to the October Crisis is not so much the assessment of the
threat from revolutionary terrorism, but the overwhelming sense of a gulf
between the authorities and the intellectuals in Québec and to a lesser extent in
english Canada. the sense that the government was isolated and did not com-
mand the moral approbation of the makers of public opinion rested on a belief
that in Québec, 90 percent of the “classes intellectuelles, académiques,” had
been reached by the separatist message.71 the intellectuals, identified as Radio-
Canada journalists, popular radio show hosts, “certains radicaux du pQ et … de
FRAp,” journals such as Québec-Presse and Quartier latin, were blamed for
inciting a “pedagogy of subversion” among Québec college and university stu-
dents, persuading them to believe that they were alienated and confused. Since
1968, this process, fomented by younger professors who touched the national-
ist and socialist emotions of their students, had been penetrated by outside
agitators who, while rarely directly involved in student protests, had been able
to ignite spectacular demonstrations among Québec students. this made higher
education “le meilleur milieu révolutionnaire en puissance” because a few out-
side agitators sympathetic to the FLQ could take advantage of this alienation
and confusion to provoke a violent confrontation with the authorities.72
in explaining how this situation had arisen, the government’s reasoning is
highly revealing. From the outset, this breakdown could be ascribed neither to
the existence of profound socio-economic cleavages in Québec society, nor to
the persistence of intractable social injustices, nor to the presence of a coherent
radical ideology, for this would be to lend credence to a substantial portion of
the FLQ grievances against the liberal-democratic regime. Most tellingly, to
employ any language suggesting an analogy between the FLQ and third World
liberation movements would, in the estimation of officials in the pMO, not only
further polarize the struggle between federalism and separatism, but would also
reinforce, in the minds of the intellectuals, the view that the FLQ did, after all,
represent a socially progressive force in Québec society. the latter assumption,
according to the authorities, rested on a widespread belief that the analogy
between the FLQ and decolonization movements was a valid one, and from the
early days of the crisis, it became a particular target of government state-
ments.73
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to avoid this potential pitfall, assessments of the situation carried out by
the pMO and federal government agencies turned, in order to explain the rise
in subversion to the point of crisis, to a somewhat more conservative explana-
tion which downplayed the clash of ideology between advocates of liberalism
and promoters of revolution. these analyses stressed the political importance
of the 18-30 age group, with a particular focus on the somewhat narcissistic
preoccupation of this cohort with asserting their own social prominence and
quest for security. Since 1958, asserted one study, a generational consciousness
had been formed among Montréal students, which resembled that found in
other parts of Canada and Western europe with its peculiar blend of a height-
ened social consciousness and allegiance to special interests. Rejecting the
authority of parents and religious values promulgated by the church, this group
found its leaders in “the top end of the generation … those who are educators,
creative artists, political thinkers and the established professions.” For the past
12 years, “they have been ‘selling’ themselves, unconsciously, on themselves.
in order for their special generation to survive they have chosen to secure their
own future politically, and generally seem to agree that they must control polit-
ically, socially and geographically in order to have this security.”74
However, where Québec differed from english Canada and the United
States was that where “the special generation” in Anglo-Saxon countries
rejected parental values, they preserved a political allegiance to the “system” by
casting their demands in terms of “the democratic rule of law,” and were thus
about ten years behind their Québec counterparts in their revolutionary
activism. Because of the violent milieu of Montréal, where many youth were
familiar with “the gangster element,” there was a greater willingness to reject
the rule of law and democratic process, and to couple revolutionary activism
with violent acts.75 this was exacerbated by the anarchic climate prevailing
within student milieus in Québec post-secondary institutions after 1968, where
mainline student organizations had largely disappeared, replaced by a bewil-
dering variety of “groupuscules” whose only common denominator propelling
them towards spasmodic action was “des thèmes nationalistes,” such as the St.
Léonard affair, the agitation over Bill 63, support for the pQ, and study of the
FLQ Manifesto.76 the overall sense, however, was that students were confused
and narcissistic, and were especially prone to be motivated by revolutionary
activism largely because with the slowing of the Québec economy, there were
no longer enough jobs open to them upon graduation. Hence, their intent was
not first and foremost in the direction of revolution and social justice, but 
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the rejection of a type of civilization that no longer corresponded to their
desires, and the search for “une certaine sécuritisation ou à défaut une certaine
évasion.”77 the appeal of revolutionary nationalism to young Québécois was
thus, according to these analyses, inspired by more conservative desires to
advance both personal and group status, and was always described as a differ-
ence or conflict in “values” between older and younger generations, or between
the capitalism and materialism of north American mainstream and the quest for
a distinctive set of Québec values that would underpin a new, and more cohe-
sive set of social relations.78 However, it should be noted that the emphasis
upon culture, values, and psychology, rather than ideology, did not provide the
authorities with greater reassurance. indeed, some officials drew the conclusion
that this would merely broaden and prolong the atmosphere of crisis, and that
without emergency legislation on the books, waves of anti-government agita-
tion would ultimately extend to other provinces like British Columbia.79
From the standpoint of officials in the pMO, one of the most imperative
considerations, apart from securing the release of James Cross, was the “psy-
war” to be waged in Québec universities and CeGeps against FLQ influence,
and the more long-term goal of detaching portions of the Québec intellectual
community from their supposedly monolithic allegiance to separatism. the
dossiers of the SOC are filled with reports from operatives in Quebec univer-
sities describing the anti-government climate throughout late October and
november 1970, and the articulation of a strategy, worked out by Jean-pierre
Mongeau, a former student leader and speech-writer for prime Minister
trudeau, and Carol Boucher, a leader of the Québec Liberal party’s youth
wing. Fearing that while the WMA had temporarily dampened student
activism, the same negative images of trudeau, Bourassa, and federalism per-
sisted on Québec campuses, and that a minority of students was still
committed to radical action.80 the “psywar” tactics pursued among Québec
students amounted to rather opéra-bouffe measures such as recruiting a pro-
federal student activist in each campus building, who was charged with
scooping up and junking radical tracts, thus forcing pro-FLQ students to the
more expensive expedient of producing posters to disseminate their message,
to keeping a watch on the doings of pro-sovereignty faculty members.81 By
early november, with the pressure of examinations looming and the continued
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presence of federal troops, Boucher and Mongeau could report that the uni-
versity situation was calmer, but expected further radical explosions in the
spring of 1971.82 Federal strategy thus moved towards more long-term plans to
win over, or at least silence the professoriate in Québec through a plan initiated
by Marc Lalonde to initiate sustained dialogue between Québec academics and
federal officials.83 He hoped through these ongoing contacts to close the dan-
gerous gap between government and intellectuals that was subversive of both
the federalist cause and that of liberal democracy in both Québec and Canada. 
indeed, that both levels of government viewed the October Crisis as less an
issue of national security and more of a profound crisis of social authority
affecting the legitimacy of a specific concept of liberal democracy is evidenced
by pierre trudeau’s broadcast to the nation on 16 October 1970. expressing
shock and revulsion at the killing of pierre Laporte by a group of “self-styled
revolutionaries” and his reluctance to invoke the WMA, he vowed to “root out
the cancer” of the FLQ. trudeau reminded his audience that “violence is also a
symptom of deep social unrest.” He pledged that his government would intro-
duce legislation to address “the social causes which often underlie or serve as
an excuse for crime and disorder,” but in the same breath warned that those who
defied the law and ignored democratic opportunities for change “will receive
no hearing from this government.”84 trudeau’s Québec counterparts spoke in
similar terms, with premier Bourassa reaffirming that his government was one
of “social progress,” dedicated to solving “the conflict between generations.”85
Where one might expect a one-dimensional discourse oriented to national
security and the restoration of law and order, the vaunting of the reformist cre-
dentials by the Liberal regimes in Ottawa and Québec City injects a note of
complexity into our understanding of the October Crisis. At one level, govern-
ment leaders intended to reassure those intellectuals and makers of public
opinion that the resort to emergency police powers did not signal either a weak-
ening or abandonment of the reformist energies of the 1960s, which had, in
large sections of the academic and intellectual communities, identified the
Liberal party with more generous social security policies.86 However, less
obviously, such statements indicated a desire, particularly among trudeau’s
inner circle, that a new, less open definition of liberal democracy was necessary
to accomplish the reconstruction of a social and ideological consensus which
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many believed had been dislocated by the political and cultural challenges of
the 1960s. this reconstruction would be accomplished through the marginal-
ization and de-legitimization of definitions of liberalism which conceded too
much ideological scope to radicalism. 
Like other liberal regimes in the western world, the governments of
Canada and Québec had experienced a far-reaching challenge to authority
stemming from the cultural transformations of the 1960s. the european events
of May 1968 were simply some of the most prominent moments in this dislo-
cation of authority, as was the alarming polarization which occurred in
American culture and politics during the latter half of the 1960s, which
destroyed the “consensus” which had stabilized that society since the Great
Depression. Read from the perspective of trudeau’s inner circle, the waves of
new Left activism on Canadian campuses culminating in 1969, and the prolif-
eration of radical groups in Québec during the late 1960s, threatened the
conditions of a stable, widely-accepted reformist political agenda by reintro-
ducing ideological competition into Canadian society.87 this, in turn, created a
sense of urgency among government insiders who both lamented the loss of sta-
ble authority and discerned a compelling need to recast political legitimacy in
new terms for a changed cultural climate. Writing to Ramsay Cook as the
October Crisis wound down, James Davey lambasted those intellectuals who
assumed that the Canadian government still possessed a “St. Laurent type” of
stability. “the reality,” he informed Cook, “is that the government is operating
very close to the margins on many issues. What power do elected or appointed
officials have today?” Davey feared that the moral authority of government had
been reduced to its bare minimum, that which was “gained daily and which is
based on the respect that an individual politician commands as a result of his
relationships with his electorate.”88 expressing the views of a number of key
officials in the pMO, Davey traced the vacuum of political authority to the suc-
cession of minority governments that had ruled Canada from 1963 to 1968.
preoccupied with survival, these governments had not given sufficient attention
to orderly planning in the spheres of environment, urban affairs, social policy,
defence, and aboriginal policy, and in the process, had neglected to institute
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modern mechanisms that would connect the individual and the government.
participation, stated Davey to the national director of the Liberal Federation of
Canada, “is the means, the link, through which the stresses in society can be
canalized and dissipated.”89
Davey’s significance at this juncture stems from his dual role in the prime
Minister’s inner circle. Despite trudeau’s later deriding of him as merely an
“intellectual,” an assessment echoed in John english’s recent biography, he
occupied an influential position as head of the SOC, responsible for coordi-
nating the political struggle against the FLQ and Québec separatism, and as
program Secretary, the key exponent within the pMO of a “futurist” approach
to government which eschewed ideological competition, emphasized scientific
approaches and the necessity of “planning” as the central dynamics of policy-
making.90 As a physicist and anglo-Montréaler, Davey undoubtedly viewed
with apprehension the possibilities for social and political disorder repre-
sented by the FLQ. However, his insistence upon the need to craft a political
response to the FLQ was rooted in an allegiance, shared with trudeau, to a
new form of liberalism. One of the roadblocks in the way of “new Liberals”
like Davey who wanted to recast Canadian liberalism in a more modern
image was that there were in existence and practice older models of civic par-
ticipation. One of the most prominent of these was corporatism, which had a
particular resonance in Québec due to the social doctrines of the Catholic
Church. Based on the theory of “intermediate bodies,” such as family, labour
unions, professional associations, and chambers of commerce which stood
between the state and the individual, corporatism posited that through insti-
tutionalized channels and organs of consultation established between the
government and these bodies, citizens would have a permanent and legiti-
mate voice in legislation and policy-making. Significantly, far from being a
relic of Duplessis-era that Québec swept aside during the Quiet Revolution,
corporatism was given a new lease on life by the policies of the Lesage
Liberal government, which ruled Québec between 1960 and 1966.91 Québec
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Justice Minister Jérôme Choquette’s reassurance on 10 October that the 
government would consult “groupes sociaux” and the priority it gave to
“comités de citoyens”92 had a clear corporatist resonance, and the 14 Oct.
petition of the 16 “eminent personalities” who offered their offices as media-
tors between the Bourassa government and the FLQ kidnappers was a more
explicit attempt to deploy Québec’s liberal corporatist heritage to the resolu-
tion of the hostage crisis.93
Although corporatism originated in a conservative philosophy of social
order and stability, it became apparent to a number of government figures dur-
ing the October Crisis that it could no longer be included in the Canadian liberal
canon. During the course of the 1960s, labour unions, one of the major players
in the corporatist vision of society, had become considerably more radical and
more confrontational in their attitude toward employers and governments.94
the “war on poverty” waged by both levels of government during the 1960s
had led to a proliferation of organizations claiming greater rights for the poor,
and out of the focus on problems of the urban environment, a large number of
“citizens’ committees” had sprung up in large Canadian cities.95 particularly in
Montréal, the years after 1967 witnessed the emergence of a “progressive coali-
tion” of community action organizations, oriented to voicing the concerns of
poorer neighbourhoods, and union activists united around a commitment to
national self-determination and radical social change.96 Were all these groups
legitimate interlocutors of the state, given the presence of radical and revolu-
tionary activists among some of them? Far from reinforcing the social authority
of the state, it was feared that the admission of these groups under the liberal
corporatist umbrella would not only institutionalize and prolong social insta-
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bility, but would lead to the grafting of “alien” ideologies of revolution and rad-
ical socialism onto Canadian liberalism, and the ideological polarization into
distinct “conservative” and “radical” options, which would further destabilize
the political system. in the process, it would destroy the raison d’être of the
Liberal party itself, but worse, it might even lead, under some circumstances,
to the admission that violence was a legitimate means to effect social change.
thus, for James Davey, in the interests of eviscerating the corporatist heritage
from Canadian liberalism, it was no exaggeration to claim that the FLQ had
penetrated most of the “intermediate” bodies in Québec. in his estimation, it
possessed sources of information inside the Québec government, the city of
Montréal, the CeGeps, and the Liberal party. “in the course of these activi-
ties,” he concluded, “the FLQ has obtained its effect through the leverage of
such groups as the unions, the corps intermédiaires, universities, and others.”97
Corporatism, either wittingly or unwittingly, had become an accomplice for the
FLQ infiltration of Québec society, and had to be vigorously countered by a
stern reprobation of the idea that Claude Ryan, union leaders, or René Lévesque
were in any way “representative” of the people of Quebec. “the Members of
parliament in Ottawa and Quebec,” declared one position paper, “are the ‘real’
people’s representatives: by regular election; people must not be fooled by
appeals on the part of some interest groups (intermediary powers) to replace the
people’s representatives: same old ‘corporatism’ idea.”98
two main outcomes resulted from the “war on terror” waged by the
Canadian government against the FLQ. the first was the death-blow to the
quest of the revolutionary activists who comprised the FLQ to become main-
stream political players in Québec. the second was a redefinition of Canadian
liberalism on narrower foundations which, its promoters in the pMO hoped,
would insulate the Canadian polity from the violence they believed was the
corollary of ideological polarization. Viewed through this lens, many of the
statements and assessments issued by the government were calculated to stifle
any lingering allegiance to corporatism among the “intellectuals” and opinion-
makers in the media. throughout november 1970, the tenets of this “new
liberalism” were articulated by leading government personalities. Speaking in
the House of Commons, Justice Minister John turner stated that as a result of
the October Crisis, “We have become aware of the fragility of the democratic
order.” in the final analysis, the survival of the “democratic order” rested upon
a “faith in a very special social order which is a part of the Canadian soul.”99
it was left, however, to prime Minister trudeau himself, on the occasion of
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the policy Conference of the national Liberal Federation on 20 november
1970, to proffer a coherent philosophical underpinning to this new liberal 
ideology. His aim, and that of his “futurist” advisers in the pMO, was to put an
end to a kind of hand-to-mouth political pragmatism and ideological bickering
that had hampered the operations of government, and in particular, to dampen
expectations that the government would move imminently in the direction of
creating an array of more generous social programs.100 J.M. Davey believed
that henceforth the ability of modern liberalism to provide social cohesion
would depend not on older practices of responding to corporate interest groups,
nor on the perfecting of a needs-based welfare state, but on the creation of
structures and processes through which social change could be harmonized
with the protection and enhancement of the “rights and dignity of the individ-
ual.” Davey concluded that the events of the 1960s had revealed a great deal of
similarity between the major political parties, and that the key to future politi-
cal success would rest upon “[m]ethodology and approach” rather than
ideology.101
in communicating Davey’s prescriptions to the wider party, trudeau stated
that liberalism’s ultimate goal was to “make sure that we are not caught up in
the vortex of change but that, on the contrary, try to dominate change,” to
ensure that Canadian society did not become the “victim” of undesired social
change,102 a clear reference to some of the radical movements of the past
decade. Convoking the assembled Mps and party activists to a new conscious-
ness of their “responsabilité libérale,” trudeau defined the modern liberal ideal
as valorizing “au plus haut degré la liberté de l’individu,” with the individual
defined as an “absolu personnel,” fully integrated into society and culture.
“L’homme libéral,” trudeau maintained, was a feature of a specific moment of
human history, and could only emerge at a stage where “la modification de la
société par la violence est devenue intolérable à un grand nombre de con-
sciences.”103 in polarizing “liberal man” and the recourse to violence, trudeau
interposed an insuperable ideological obstacle between Canadian liberalism
and forms of radical activism that had flourished in the climate of the 1960s.
these he dismissed as “déchets de l’histoire,” an atavistic return to the “magie,
et la superstition” characteristic of prehistory,104 and therefore incompatible
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with life in a modern polity. However, it was in his definition of the modern
state, that he drew the clearest possible distinction between the new liberalism
and its predecessors. Where older models of liberalism defined the citizen as
the product of a mediation between individual and government involving a
panoply of semi-public institutions, trudeau now defined it as one of direct,
unmediated contact. Referring to emmanuel Mounier, his maître à penser,
trudeau charged the state with guaranteeing the fundamental status of the
human person and removing obstacles to the free competition of spiritual com-
munities. in accomplishing the second part of its task, the state was justified in
using “contrainte” to ensure that no extraneous forces menaced the human per-
son. the key to governing a modern state, he stated, was to bring government
and people closer together, through better systems of communication and
through an enhancement of the state’s ability to balance organizational com-
plexity with protection of the human person.105 this assertion of an unmediated
connection between government and individual would abolish the screen of
semi-public institutions which, in an earlier phase of liberalism, had constituted
civil society and had given meaning to citizenship. in trudeau’s emphatically
modernist political calculus, these institutions, at best, hampered the work of
government and at worst, harboured atavistic, non-liberal ideologies.
Henceforth, apart from corps intermédiaires such as the police and security ser-
vices, whose interests were directed to the preservation of law and order, the
only “collective” organizations and social movements worthy of dialogue and
state support were those devoted to furthering trudeau’s emphatic commitment
to the extension of “personal” rights. indeed, the funding of human rights orga-
nizations and social movements engaged in constitutional politics were a
hallmark of his administrations after 1970 because, significantly, they did not
deviate from the new liberal rapprochement of state and individual, articulated
a pan-Canadian nationalism, and most emphatically, they did not represent ide-
ologies advocating a recasting of the socio-economic order.106 He believed that
his new vision of the relationship between state and individual could underpin
the modern democratic order by enlisting an overwhelming public consensus
among the Canadian public, intellectuals, and makers of opinion. in destroying
the terrorist menace, trudeau and his advisers sought to achieve a much larger
aim, that of moving Canadian politics into a new era, one where the authority
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of technique would replace the competition of ideologies as the vector of social
change.
* * *
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